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In order to create incentives for Internet traffic providers not to discriminate 
with respect to certain applications on the basis of network capacity require-
ments, the concept of market driven network neutrality is introduced. Its basic 
characteristics are that all applications are bearing the opportunity costs of the 
required traffic capacities. An economic framework for market driven network 
neutrality in broadband Internet is provided, consisting of congestion pricing 
and quality of service differentiation. However, network neutrality regulation 
with its reference point of the traditional TCP would result in regulatory micro-
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 1.  Mandatory versus market driven network neutrality 
 
The evolution of the Internet is characterized by the transition from narrowband 
to broadband Internet. The narrowband Internet provided low speed access for 
services like e-mails, download of small documents etc. Thus, all applications 
were time insensitive and required similar low traffic capacity. In contrast, 
broadband Internet provides high speed access for a large scope of heterogene-
ous applications. Some applications, such as interactive video-gaming, voice 
over IP or video streaming are time sensitive, whereas other applications, such 
as content distribution or e-mailing are time insensitive. Some applications are 
capacity intensive, such as peer-to-peer exchange of videos or video on demand. 
Others need only little capacity, such as voice over IP or e-mails. 
 
The recent world wide net neutrality debate has shifted public attention to the 
challenges faced by the traditional Internet which transports data packages on 
the basis of the best-effort transmission control protocol (TCP), assigning all 
data packets equal priority. TCP manages end-to-end connections by limiting 
the traffic offered by a sender when it detects congestion (Cerf, Kahn, 1974; Ja-
cobson, 1988). Best-effort average traffic quality results endogenously, depend-
ing (positively) on capacity and (negatively) on traffic without quality of service 
guarantee of the data packet transmission (Cremer, Rey, Tirole, 2000, 455 f.). 
Due to the transition from narrowband access to broadband access, congestion 
and heterogeneous requirements for traffic qualities become increasingly impor-
tant (Lehr, McKnight, 2002). As a consequence, best-effort average quality net-
works cannot be expected to provide the necessary allocation mechanisms to 
fulfil the heterogeneous requirements for traffic qualities. 
 
Network neutrality is often considered as a rather vague concept with no gener-
ally accepted unique definition. However, generally the term “network neutral-
ity” is used as a regulatory concept, addressing what deviations should be per-
mitted from the traditional best-effort TCP (Schwartz, Weiser, 2009, 1). Accord-
ing to the OECD the notion of network neutrality “has recently been used to de-
scribe a data network that assigns all transmissions equal priority as they are 
passed along the network” (OECD, 2006, 3). This  is a plea against traffic     2 
shaping within the Internet and the resultant challenge to the traditional best-
effort transmission. According to the European Commission declaration on net 
neutrality the focus of net neutrality is “the creation of safeguard powers for  
national regulatory authorities to prevent the degradation of services and the 
hindering or slowing down of traffic over public networks”.
1
 
 In October 2009 
the U.S. Federal Communications Commission proposed network neutrality 
regulations in order to implement a principle of non-discrimination: “We under-
stand the term “nondiscriminatory” to mean that a broadband Internet access 
service provider may not charge a content, application, or service provider for 
enhanced or prioritized access to the subscribers of the broadband Internet ac-
cess service provider, …. We propose that this rule would not prevent a broad-
band Internet access service provider from charging subscribers different prices 
for different services” (FCC, 2009, 42). 
The network neutrality debate is confronted with several fallacies: The first fal-
lacy is the lack of differentiation between mandatory network neutrality and 
market driven network neutrality. Mandatory network neutrality consists of ex 
ante regulation of traffic management based on the traditional TCP. In contrast, 
market driven network neutrality means an entrepreneurial search for traffic al-
location in such a way that there are no incentives for the Internet traffic service 
provider to discriminate between possible network applications on the basis of 
network capacity requirements. This is the case, if any application is charged 
according to the opportunity costs of traffic capacities it requires.  
 
The second fallacy is the lack of differentiation between the impact of TCP in 
narrowband and broadband Internet. In the narrowband Internet the best-effort 
TCP fulfils the criteria of market driven network neutrality. Since all applica-
tions are homogeneous with respect to transmission quality and transmission 
capacity, the TCP creates no incentives to discriminate between different appli-
cations. In contrast, in the broadband Internet with its many and heterogeneous 
applications the TCP creates large discrimination potentials. On the one hand, 
                                                 
1   Commission declaration on net neutrality, Official Journal of the European Union,  
C 308/2, 18.12.2009   3 
low capacity applications are discriminated against by high capacity applica-
tions, on the other hand, time sensitive applications are discriminated against by 
time insensitive applications.  
 
The third fallacy is to destroy market driven network neutrality by network neu-
trality regulation. Market driven network neutrality requires an evolutionary 
search for price and quality differentiation in order to reflect the opportunity 
costs of traffic capacity. Irrespective of how network neutrality regulation would 
be implemented in detail, it would limit the entrepreneurial flexibility with re-
spect to the design of Internet architecture, traffic quality differentiation, and 
flexible transmission pricing. 
 
The fourth fallacy is the statutory prohibition under the heading of network neu-
trality of providers of Internet access services charging providers of Internet ap-
plication services for enhanced or prioritized access. The focus of the debate is 
on whether Internet application providers should be protected from the abuse of 
market power of Internet access providers (Economides, 2008, 210; FCC, 2009, 
30). Instead of forbidding price and quality differentiation of Internet traffic 
providers, it is necessary to regulate market power at its roots, meaning the re-
maining monopolistic bottleneck components within the local loop in the tele-
communications network. The complementary Internet traffic markets are under 
the constraint of both active and potential competition. This includes active and 
potential competition between alternative Internet access service providers as 
well as between Internet backbone service providers (Faratin et al., 2007; 
Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2008, 127 ff.).  
 
The fifth fallacy became known as the “dirt road” fallacy. FCC (2009, 30 f.) ar-
gued that price and quality discrimination would create incentives for Internet 
access service providers to reduce or fail to increase the transmission capacity 
available for standard best-effort Internet access service relative to higher qual-
ity services in order to increase their revenues. Contrary to this claim of ad hoc 
discrimination between high quality and low quality users, market driven net-
work neutrality provides incentives to Internet traffic providers to offer a consis-
tent choice of user charges and capacity allocation.   4 
In the subsequent section 2 the discriminatory potentials of the TCP in broad-
band networks are pointed out. In order to avoid inefficient application restric-
tions, a shift from the traditional best-effort TCP towards more intelligent net-
work architectures is required, allowing traffic shaping and prioritization of data 
packets. In section 3 the potentials of congestion pricing in broadband Internet 
are considered. Whereas under TCP each packet has an equal chance of getting 
through or being dropped, under congestion pricing dropping is not randomly 
but according to the willingness to pay indicated in the header of IP packets. 
Section 4 is devoted to quality differentiation of Internet traffic in order to allow 
priority pricing for time sensitive applications. This allows combining conges-
tion pricing and quality of service differentiation. From the perspective of price 
differentiation of different service qualities, traffic prices should fulfil their in-
centive function in such a way that users with high preference for quality (low 
congestion) have the possibility to get premium quality transport. Finally, the 
role of quality of service based interconnection agreements based on interclass 
externalities is discussed.  
 
 
2.  The discrimination potentials of TCP in broadband Internet  
 
A major characteristic of TCP is that it only controls the sending rate for a single 
traffic flow. Flow rate fairness is based on Jacobson’s (1988) congestion and 
control mechanisms. TCP works by constantly increasing its rate until some link 
along the way to the receiver cannot handle the traffic flow and has to drop the 
packet. The sending computer halves its rate when retransmitting the missing 
packets. Since TCP controls each traffic flow separately, it cannot differentiate 
between heavy and light users of capacity. In particular, TCP does not take into 
account whether there are multiple TCP flows running on a single end-node. 
Thus, TCP does not take into account the aggregated usage of traffic capacity 
from a computer during a given time interval (Bauer et al., 2009, 3). Although 
the TCP tries to share the bit rate equally within the traffic flow, due to ran-
domization of packet dropping it merely gives an illusion of fairness. A user gets 
multiple capacity shares if he runs multiple data flows at once. TCP gives much   5 
higher shares of capacity to the heavy users and much less to the light users 
(Briscoe, 2008).  
 
A strategy of traffic service providers consists in network user restrictions with 
the goal of limiting the capacity consumption of heavy users. A survey of 
broadband usage restrictions has been provided by Wu (2003, 158ff.). Contrac-
tual restrictions on providing content effected the end user’s sharing of content 
in contrast to simply downloading content. The restrictions favoured client-
server applications over peer-to-peer applications. Other restrictions on applica-
tions have been prohibitions on applications for commercial use, restricting the 
number of computers that can be attached to a single connection and controlling 
the deployment of home wireless networks. Architectural restrictions may exist, 
due to the allocation of asymmetric bandwidth by designing networks to provide 
more downstream bandwidth than upstream, such that end-users can download 
more data packets than upload.  
 
In the meantime, the degree of asymmetry of traffic capacity consumption be-
tween heavy and light users is enormously increasing. An illustrative example is 
provided by the Comcast-Case. Comcast is the leading provider of cable televi-
sion and the number two provider of high-speed Internet connections in the U.S. 
The members of Free Press and Public Knowledge are subscribers of Comcast 
high-speed Internet access and many use peer-to-peer applications through 
Comcast or another network provider. The formal complaint in October 2007 
was: “Comcast is secretly degrading peer-to-peer protocols, threatening to un-
dermine the Internet’s open and interconnected character, discourage broadband 
use, and crippling the innovation the Internet has made possible” (FCC, 2007, 
1). In August 2008 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) addressed 
the question whether it would be reasonable network management praxis for 
Comcast to interfere with its customers’ applications of BitTorrent (FCC, 2008). 
Unlike traditional methods of file sharing which require establishing a single 
TCP connection between a user’s computer and a single server, BitTorrent is a 
peer-to-peer networking protocol employing a decentralized distribution ap-
proach, all via TCP connections. Each computer in the BitTorrent swarm is able 
to download content from other computers in the swarm and each computer also   6 
uploads contents for the members of the peer-group. Moreover, a computer can 
download different portions of the same content from multiple computers simul-
taneously. While Comcast claimed that its interference into BitTorrent’s applica-
tions were required to manage scarce network capacity, the opponents claimed 
that Comcast had arbitrarily blocked subscribers’ access to applications, not ap-
plying a consistent congestion based approach. The FCC decided that Comcast’s 
network management practices in the BitTorrent-Case would be considered un-
reasonable and should not continue.
2
 
 In this context the FCC suggested some ad-
hoc solutions, such as capping the average user’s capacity and charging the 
heaviest users’ overage fees, or to throttle back the connection speed of high ca-
pacity users. However, these ad-hoc suggestions by the FCC for managing net-
work traffic would not guarantee market driven network neutrality, because the 
opportunity costs of capacity usage were not consistently taken into account. In 
order to provide the proper incentives for network usage, congestion pricing 
models become relevant.  
The provision of time sensitive applications needs guaranteed timely and steady 
packet delivery. The traditional TCP is not able to provide prioritization of data 
packets and quality of service guarantees. Thus, best-effort TCP transmission 
quality is not sufficient to guarantee the provisions of time sensitive applica-
tions; this entails a further important discrimination potential of TCP. In order to 
provide market driven network neutrality the transition to more “intelligent” 
Internet architecture is necessary. Different technical solutions may be chosen to 
implement quality differentiation of transport of data packages.  
 
 
                                                 
2   In a petition for review of the FCC order the United States Court of Appeals decided 
that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) would have no statutorily 
mandated responsibility to regulate the network management practices of an Internet 
service provider. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
decided April 6, 2010, No. 08-1291, Comcast Cooperation, Petitioner v. Federal 
Communications Commission and United States of America, Respondents, NBC 
Universal, et al., Intervenors, On Petition for Review of an Order of the Federal 
Communications Commission.       7 
3.  Congestion pricing in broadband Internet 
 
The basic goal of congestion based per packet pricing is to charge the user rela-
tive to the amount of congestion in the network. Congestion increases with the 
number of packets. When the network is uncongested, the cost of transporting an 
additional packet is minimal; when the network is congested, the cost of trans-
porting an additional packet grows with the degree of congestion. The model of 
congestion pricing, applied to the problem of Internet traffic by MacKie-Mason 
and Varian (1995), is extended to the multi-channel case where the network is 
partitioned into separate channels. Since there is no priority implied among 
channels, from the perspective of the users only the degree of congestion within 
the different channels is relevant. It is shown that under competition price dif-
ferentiation among channels with equal congestion cannot be stable. Thus, con-




3.1  Single-channel congestion pricing 
 
The starting point is the well known concept of congestion pricing based on 
transportation economics which has been introduced to the field of Internet traf-
fic by MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995, 288 ff.). All data packets pay a uniform 
congestion fee and are served without priority. Thus, socially optimal congestion 
pricing in a single channel network without quality of service differentiation has 
been derived. For each chosen capacity holds: when demand is low und conges-
tion is low the packet price is low; when demand is high and congestion is high 
the packet price is high. If a network is strongly congested, the opportunity costs 
of an additional data packet are high and thereby optimal congestion prices are 
high. Thus, optimal prices reflect the level of congestion. Users not prepared to 
pay the congestion fee are excluded from data packet transmission. Optimal 
congestion fees (short run problem) and the optimal choice of capacity (long run 
problem) are derived simultaneously, supposing that several competing firms 
provide traffic services.  
   8 
The allocation of traffic flows (short run) can take place over time scales rang-
ing from seconds to minutes to days. Provisioning of network resources (in par-




 Most congestion pricing theories assume an ex ante fixed price 
schedule for each (short run) time period, and thus a regular pattern of demand. 
MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995, 292) considered a kind of smart pricing 
where users do not pay the price that they actually bid, but rather pay for the 
packets at the market clearing price – reflecting the maximum bid amount of all 
packets that are not served – which will be lower than bids of all admitted pack-
ets. Thus, a uniform price for the transmission of data packets results within 
each short run time period.  
 
3.2  Multi-channel congestion pricing 
 
Network capacity (bandwidth, buffer space) is allocated to each channel sepa-
rately. In particular, separate channels are not allowed to use spare resources 
from other channels. There are no quantifiable requirements with respect to de-
lay or jitter associated with the forwarding of data packets. Thus, short term 
congestion may become relevant (Bouras, Sevasti, 2004, 1878). In the context of 
Internet traffic allocation problems it has been suggested (Cheng, Zhang, 2004, 
375) that there is no priority implied among channels, although the resources 
allocated to each channel might be different. Only the degree of congestion is 
relevant. If two channels are equally congested, the users are indifferent. Chan-
nel numbering does not indicate any quality of service hierarchy.
4
                                                 
3   In contrast, investment decisions in transportation sectors (e.g. roads) have a much 
larger time horizon. 
 From the cost 
side there are countervailing effects of channel separation. Since congestion in-
creases with the number of packets, congestion costs are reduced by separating 
traffic into several channels. On the other hand, multiplexing advantages of an 
4   In contrast, intermodal approaches to congestion fees for various transportation infra-
structures examine alternative traffic modes (rail, road, etc.). Demand functions for 
different modes of traffic differ systematically and cross elasticities between differ-
ent traffic modes are relevant (Braeutigam, 1979).    9 
integrated network (with only one channel) are lost. Moreover, economies of 




Under competition on the markets for Internet traffic each traffic service pro-
vider makes his autonomous decisions. For each chosen number of channels the 
bandwidths and usage dependent prices for the different channels are derived 
simultaneously. There is no social planner to globally optimize capacities and 
prices for all traffic service networks. In the following the allocation problems 
of an arbitrarily chosen traffic service provider under free entry are analyzed.  
 
It is assumed that the network of a typical traffic service provider consists of n 
logically separated channels. Let  ( ) it it Q P  denote the inverse demand function for 
packet transmission in channel i in period t with traffic flow it Q . We assume that 
demand is independent across time periods, because we do not aim to analyze 
intertemporal demand interdependencies. There is no reshifting of capacity from 
one time period to another between channels. It is reasonable to consider a sin-
gle scalar that summarizes the resource requirement of any given channel   
(Paschalidis, 2000, 172). Capacity costs of the channel with bandwidth  i w  are 
denoted ( ) i i w ρ .  
 
Let  ( ) i it it w Q k ,  be the private (average) variable costs of a packet transmission 









 if capacity  i w  remains constant, additional traffic within channel i will 









                                                 
5   This may be relevant in access service networks rather than backbone service net-








 if traffic remains constant, additional bandwidth capacity of channel i 
will allow to speed up every packet in this channel. 
 
Under competition each traffic service provider chooses channel capacities and 
packet prices in each channel in such a way as to maximize profit. The profit 
maximization problem is defined by:  
(1) 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]






















nt nt nt t t t n nt t
w Q w Q k




1 1 1 1 1
,
... ,..., , ,...,
ρ
  
Necessary conditions for the maximum are derived by differentiating (1) with 
respect to  nt t Q Q ,..., 1 for each t=1,…,T and with respect to  n w w ,..., 1 and setting 




The optimal pricing rule concerning the congestion fee for a packet transmission 
on channel i is given by: 












τ   t=1,…,T;  i=1,…n 
Increasing congestion results in higher packet charges. 
 
The first best optimal rule for (bandwidth) capacity in channel i is given by: 



















  i=1,…,n 
                                                 
6   The optimal pricing and investment rule under competition equals the socially   
optimal pricing and investment rule under maximisation of social welfare. For the 
case of one channel without quality of service differentiation see also McKie-Mason, 
Varian, 1995, 301 ff.    11 
Simultaneous solutions of equation (2) and (3) provide first-best allocation of 
traffic flows 
* *
1 ,..., nt t Q Q   t=1,…,T   between the different channels as well as 
first-best capacity dimensions for each individual channel 
* *
1,..., n w w  
 
The following conclusions can be drawn: 











= τ  
Congestion externalities in channel i are increasing with the number of packets 
transmitted in this channel. Due to the bandwidth reservation for each channel, 
only externalities within separate channels are relevant, whereas externalities 
between channels (inter-channel externalities) do not occur. Optimal congestion 
fees increase with the level of congestion. Congestion fees within each channel i 
it τ may vary over time, if demand varies over time. 






















, ρ  
Capacity (bandwidth) in each channel i should be extended to the point where 
the marginal cost of an extra unit of capacity is equal to its marginal benefits of 
reduced congestion (for the packet flow) within channel i. In particular, the ex-
tension of capacity until all congestion disappears (maximum quality) would not 
be optimal and lead to over-capacity.  
 
Since there is no priority implied among channels, from the perspective of the 
users only the degree of congestion within the different channels is relevant. If 
congestion is different on different channels, the price must reflect this differ-
ence in congestion externalities. Since more congested channels are more ex-
pensive, incentives occur to switch to less congested and cheaper channels. 
Thus, in equilibrium traffic may split symmetrically to different channels with 
identical bandwidth and identical optimal congestion fees. Alternatively if 
bandwidth capacity varies among channels, the number of packets must also be 
adapted such that the level of congestion and the congestion prices remain iden-
tical.    12 
Consider for example the case of two channels with w2<w1.  
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Optimal congestion prices of the smaller and the larger channel are identical. 
Optimal multi-channel congestion pricing and capacity choice within the net-
work of each network service provider result in a complete absence of quality of 
service differentiation.  
 
Under competition price differences between service providers can only be sta-
ble if they are completely caused by different congestion levels. Otherwise, us-
ers would switch to alternative traffic service providers offering the same degree 
of congestion at a lower price. However, specialised single quality networks 
with different congestion levels cannot survive under competition. Users would 
immediately switch from the more expensive and more congested network (with 
under-capacity) to a cheaper and less congested network (with over-capacity). In 
equilibrium optimal capacity and optimal congestion prices are identical. Thus, 
even the extension to multi-channel congestion pricing does not lead to quality 
of service differentiation with quality guarantees.  
 
 
4.  Quality of service differentiation based on interclass  
externality pricing 
 
In the following quality of service differentiation within the Internet architecture 
of differentiated services (DiffServ) networks will be analyzed. Within DiffServ 
architecture data packets are classified into an exogenously determined number 
of classes at the network edge. Only the edge routers (ingress or egress edge   13 
routers) perform packet classification based on the priority information in the 
packet header, whereas core routers inside each DiffServ domain only deal with 
aggregated traffic for given service classes (Chen, Zhang, 2004, 370 ff.).  
 
Within each DiffServ-enabled domain, servicing of packets by routers is per-
formed according to traffic classes, not according to the flow to which they be-
long. Thus, within a DiffServ domain, all packets belonging to a given quality of 
service class receive the same treatment; in particular, within one service class 
no priority rule is applied. Due to its scalability the DiffServ framework is con-
sidered particularly suitable for larger packet transmission networks (Bouras, 
Sevasti, 2004, 1868 f.). 
 
From the perspective of price differentiation of different service qualities, traffic 
prices should fulfil their incentive function in such a way that users with high 
preference for quality (low congestion) have the possibility to get premium traf-
fic quality. Traffic prices should be monotonic with respect to decreasing quality 
of service classes, such that premium class packets have to pay the highest price. 
Whereas in congestion pricing models prices are high if congestion is high, 
quality of service price differentiation requires premium class users to pay high 
prices to enjoy absence of congestion. The purpose is to combine both ap-
proaches to develop incentive compatible quality of service differentiation 
within the networks of Internet traffic service providers under competition.  
 
Data packets are transmitted on one channel only and no network partitioning is 
applied. The DiffServ scheduler router offers a predefined number of traffic 
classes using strict priority scheduling. A packet is inserted into the transmission 
buffer behind previous packets of the same traffic class but ahead of packets of a 
lower traffic class. The scheduler transmits the packets which are at the head of 
the buffer; packets at the tail of the buffer are dropped as soon as the buffer is 
full. Traffic quality can be measured by mean packet delay and packet loss. Ap-
plying the strict priority scheduler, traffic classes are monotone with respect to 
traffic quality. Packets within a higher traffic class will be transported with 
lower delay and lower loss than packets within lower traffic classes (Jin, Jordan, 
2005, 842).   14 
Depending on the demand for high quality, medium quality and low quality traf-
fic, quality of service in different classes results endogenously. The carrier pro-
vides a quality of service guarantee for the data packet transmission within a 
quality of service class – irrespective of the forwarding rate of lower classes 
(Borella et al., 1999, 279; Chen, Zhang, 2004, 374 f.) – defining a maximum 
allowable delay and packet loss.  
 
 
4.1  Intraclass externalities versus interclass externalities 
 
Consider the network of a typical traffic service provider with packet transmis-
sion in quality of service classes within one channel. Application of strict prior-
ity scheduling provides a structure for congestion externalities. It is important to 
differentiate between congestion externalities within a traffic class (intraclass 
externalities) and congestion externalities between traffic classes (interclass ex-
ternalities). Intraclass externalities reflect the delays which an additional data 




ities reflect the delays which an additional data packet imposes on the data 
packets in the other quality classes. 
Consider the congestion pricing framework introduced in section 3 adapted to 
one channel only. Packets are classified and grouped into n  different traffic 
classes. Let ( ) it it Q P  denote the inverse demand for aggregated traffic in traffic 
class i in period t with traffic flow it Q .  ( ) w ρ  denotes the capacity costs of the 
channel with bandwidth w. 
 
Let  ( ) w Q Q k nt t it , ,..., 1 ,  n i ,..., 1 =  be the private (average) variable costs of a 
packet transmission within traffic class i, which also depend on the flows of 
packets in other traffic classes. 
                                                 
7   Within DiffServ architecture all data packets  within the same class are treated 
equally, thus only average delay within a quality class is considered but not the indi-
vidual delay of a packet depending on the position of the data packets within the 





kit ,  n i ,..., 1 =   if traffic remains constant, additional bandwidth capacity 









 if capacity w remains constant, additional traffic within traffic class i 
will slow down packets in its own class as well as in other service classes, 
thereby raising externality costs.  
 
Externality costs caused by a given packet for all other packets may encompass 
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Due to the strict priority rule, interclass externalities are top-down / one sided. 
Only upper traffic classes cause interclass externalities for lower classes, but not 
vice versa. Interclass externality of class i to subsequent classes i + 1,…,n (ex-













 t = 1,…,T 
 
 
4.2  Price and quality differentiation based on interclass externalities 
pricing 
 
The basic idea is to define a hierarchy of service classes, such that the highest 
quality class is the most expensive and the least congested. The prices are mono-
tone decreasing with the number of the quality classes. Packets within the lowest 
quality class (with the highest congestion) should be charged the lowest price.     16 
The starting point for the development of such price differentiation strategies are 
the opportunity costs of network usage due to congestion externalities. Under 
competition each traffic service provider chooses the channel capacity and 
packet prices in each traffic class.  
 
The profit maximisation problem is defined by: 
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Necessary conditions for the maximum are derived by differentiating (4) with 
respect to  nt t Q Q ,..., 1 for each t=1,…,T and with respect to w. 
 
The optimal pricing rules concerning the congestion fee for a packet transmis-
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Simultaneous solutions of equation (5) and (6) provide optimal allocation of 
traffic flows 
* *
1 ,..., nt t Q Q   t=1,…,T as well as optimal capacity dimension w* . 
 
Due to heterogeneous demand for different traffic qualities it is neither eco-
nomically efficient nor incentive compatible to extend capacity, in such a way 
that for all users the highest quality class would be provided.
8
                                                 
8   The extra capacity required in order to transmit all data packets at premium quality 
has been analyzed in Yuksel et al., 2007.   
 Instead, extension 
of capacity is beneficial until the marginal cost of an additional capacity unit is   17 
equal to the sum of marginal benefits of reduced opportunity costs of capacity 
usage in each quality class.  
 
It is important to differentiate between the quality of traffic in a given class, 
which is determined by intraclass externalities, and the opportunity costs caused 
to the subsequent classes, which is determined by interclass externalities. Qual-
ity of service based price differentiation can be developed by focussing on the 
opportunity costs which the transmission of packets in high quality classes 
causes to the packets in subsequent lower classes. Even if the traffic in the pre-
mium class is low (and intraclass externality prices would be zero), the delay 
imposed by high priority traffic to the traffic of subsequent classes may be sub-
stantial. Opportunity costs of the transmission of data packets under strict prior-
ity scheduling are strongly determined by interclass externalities, the increasing 
delay of lower class packets due to the transmission of premium class packets. 
In contrast, intraclass externalities in upper classes are of less importance, given 
the quality standard is defined high enough, such that transportation quality is 
sufficient for all relevant applications independent of the traffic load in this 
class.  
 
Congestion fees based on interclass externalities are monotone. 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ,..., 1 2 1 > > > − t t t n τ τ τ  
and the lowest traffic class with the highest intraclass externalities has a data 
packet transmission price of zero. 
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Quality of service based price differentiation according to interclass externality 
pricing provides incentive compatible prices. Users with higher preference for 
priority traffic services have the possibility to choose a higher service class and 
thereby to pay a higher price for high quality (less congested) traffic services. 
Moreover, its advantage is that important elements of congestion pricing are in-
cluded. High priority users have to compensate for additional traffic delay im-
posed on lower classes. These opportunity costs can hardly be ignored when es-
tablishing competitive pricing strategies and should therefore survive under 
competition and free entry in Internet traffic service markets.  
 
Congestion fees based on interclass externalities result in a price of zero for the 
lowest quality traffic class n. Since in the lowest traffic class n no quality guar-
antee is provided, intraclass externality pricing may be applied in class n to 
solve the allocation problem of packet dropping and socially inefficient delay. 
The intraclass externality price in class n is always lower than the interclass ex-
ternality price of class n-1. Due to top priority scheduling an additional package 
in class n-1 causes a larger delay on the packages in class n than an additional 
packet in class n. Thus, monotony of traffic class prices is guaranteed. 
 
In contrast to the claimed ad hoc allocation of capacity between high quality and 
low quality classes in the above mentioned “dirt road” fallacy, capacity is allo-
cated endogenously between the different quality classes according to the degree 
of heterogeneity between the different consumers. Since the capacity is chosen 
endogenously, an increase in the demand for high quality transmission with sub-
sequent high opportunity costs of additional high quality traffic will lead to an 
incentive compatible capacity extension.
9
 
   
Price differentiation based on interclass externalities should allow viability of 
the traffic service providers under competition. Since intraclass externalities are 
neglected in the packet prices, and economies of scale with respect to bandwidth 
expansion may occur (in particular in access service networks), a competitive 
                                                 
9   For a detailed criticism of the “dirt road” fallacy see Sidak, Teece, 2010, 56 ff.    19 
search for cost covering tariff structures becomes relevant.
10 One possibility is to 
apply mark-ups on interclass externalities based on price elasticities of demand 




Under the assumption that price elasticities for the demand in higher traffic 
classes are lower, the monotony of packet charges is still guaranteed. As an al-
ternative, in particular in access service networks two-part tariffs can be applied 
with a fixed connection charge and a variable data packet transmission fee based 
on interclass externalities.  
 
4.3  Quality of service based interconnection agreements based on  
interclass externalities 
 
Increasing congestion and asymmetric traffic flows and increasing demand for 
traffic quality differentiation result in a need for more complex interconnection 
contracts among different network carriers. New forms of interconnection ar-
rangements, such as partial transit, paid peering, secondary peering, have arisen. 
By means of secondary peering arrangements the participating networks directly 
exchange traffic destined for each other’s customers bypassing the universal 
connectivity providing core networks (Besen et al., 2001, 292f; Laffont et al., 
2001, 288). Paid peering arrangements reflect the increasing asymmetry of in-
terconnection traffic by allowing side payments between peering partners. In 
contrast to the traditional full transit arrangements, partial transit arrangements 
only guarantee interconnection to a subset of Internet users. As a consequence, 
Internet interconnection agreements are becoming more complex (Faratin et al., 
2007). These innovative interconnection solutions are still based on average 
transportation quality, ignoring the potentials of quality of service differentiation 
                                                 
10  It is well known from transportation economics that for the case of constant returns 
to scale with respect to capacity expansion, optimal congestion fees cover the capac-
ity costs. However, if there are economies of scale with respect to capacity expan-
sion, optimal congestion fees result in a deficit (Mohring, Harwitz, 1962, 81-86). 
11  For the concept of Ramsey pricing for competitive services (endogenous Ramsey 
pricing), see e.g. Baumol, Willig, 1983, 36 ff.    20 
based on traffic classes. As a consequence, there is an increasing need to bargain 
on quality of service based interconnections arrangements.  
 
Global service level agreements based on universal quality of service have been 
considered as one possible solution. A global market would be created for all 
networks in order to provide a quality of service guaranteed interconnection ser-
vice (Li et al., 2004, 93). An alternative proposal is to search for an agreement 
on one global quality of service standard scheme (Borella et al., 1999, 287). 
However, due to the large number of possible priority schemes and the large 
number of participants involved, achieving a global bargaining solution seems 
unrealistic.  
 
Instead, an evolutionary search for bilateral and multilateral quality of service 
based service level agreements should be initiated and should not be disturbed 
by government regulations (e.g. prescribing specific quality of service stan-
dards). Thus, bilateral or multilateral interconnection agreements among Internet 
traffic service providers taking into account different quality of service classes 
can develop. Quality differentiated service level agreements by means of inter-
class externality pricing provide compensation of the opportunity costs for offer-
ing premium services. Interconnection charges according to interclass external-
ities are incentive compatible, because compensation of the marginal congestion 
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